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Winning 
Lessons from 
the NAFTA Loss 
• Rand Wilson 
The period around last fall's Congressional vote on the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was the best of times and the 
worst of times for organized labor. 
The threat of NAFTA's passage galvanized tens of thousands of 
rank-and-file union activists. Working in local coalitions with farmers, 
environmentalists, consumer advocates, Perot supporters, and other 
forces, union members waged a spirited, high-profile campaign over a 
public-policy question affecting millions of Americans. 
"ROUGHSHOD AND MUSCLE-BOUND" 
The class lines in this fight were sharply drawn, with the Clinton 
administration, corporate America, the mass media, the Republican 
Party, and many leading Democrats on one side, and the labor-led grass-
roots opposition on the other. Often belittled and ignored in the press, 
labor was able briefly to reach—and finally speak for—a mass working-
class audience. 
In their dealings with members of Congress undecided on this issue, 
trade unionists dropped their usual reliance on polite entreaties of 
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professional Washington lobbyists and played a long overdue game of 
outside-the-Beltway hardball. "Friends of labor"—poised to cast the 
most anti-labor vote of their careers—were besieged with phone calls, 
petitions, picket lines, and angry delegations of working-class con-
stituents. President Clinton himself was moved to complain about 
labor's "roughshod" tactics and "muscle-bound" approach. 
After many years in which union discourse about trade policy was 
dominated by Toyota-bashing and "Buy American" flag-waving, labor's 
intervention in the NAFTA debate displayed a far more positive strain 
of internationalism. While the Perot forces voiced many workers' con-
cerns about the consequences of unfettered capital mobility (the famous 
giant "sucking sound") and loss of sovereignty, much of the labor move-
ment avoided narrow economic nationalism and protectionism. Labor 
organizations and progressive union activists used the NAFTA fight to 
articulate progressive concerns about the pace, consequences, and terms 
of global economic integration. 
While some anti-NAFTA events were still marred by nativist rhetoric 
and demeaning images of Mexicans in ponchos and sombreros, many 
rallies featured speakers from Mexico or Canada, reflecting the under-
standing that workers in all three countries were going to be adversely 
affected by NAFTA. The dreadful workplace conditions, labor rights 
violations, and political repression south of the boarder were publicized 
in a manner reminiscent of the labor-based anti-intervention move-
ment of the 1980s involving Central America. 
Prior to the Congressional vote, hundreds of American local union 
officers and rank-and-file members made personal visits to factories, local 
union halls, and working-class communities where U.S. companies are 
already operating in Mexico. Institutional relationships were forged 
with the struggling unofficial unions and rank-and file caucuses critical 
of the pro-government CTM labor federation. 
RHETORIC VS REALITY 
The bad news, of course, is that labor lost. While the campaign against 
NAFTA certainly raised political consciousness and unleashed an impres-
sive wave of rank-and-file activism, labor's ultimate defeat left its mem-
bership angry, frustrated, and politically confused. The confusion is 
due, in part, to the big gap between the sabre-rattling union rhetoric 
about the consequences of politicians' voting for NAFTA's passage 
versus the reality of a quick return to labor politics-as-usual. 
\ 
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GRASSROOTS JUICE 
In May, 1991, the Stop NAFTA campaign got off to a rocky start 
after Congress overwhelmingly approved "fast track/' a procedural vote 
enabling the Bush Administration to present a negotiated treaty to 
Congress and have it voted up or down without amendments. Even 
Majority Leader Richard Gephardt—usually a stalwart on trade issues— 
got an approving wink from Lane Kirkland and voted in favor. NAFTA 
looked like a done deal. 
Nevertheless, across the country dozens of small local groups and a 
few state organizations began the grassroots fight against NAFTA. Led 
by a hard core of "fair-trade" activists drawn from labor, environmental, 
family farm, and social justice constituencies, these groups laid the 
foundation for a vigorous national fight by conducting modest educa-
tional activities and periodic public demonstrations. With assistance 
from the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy's Fair Trade Campaign 
and their Canadian and Mexican counterparts, a vibrant network of 
fair-trade committees and Stop NAFTA coalitions eventually emerged 
in more than 40 states. 
In the beginning, many of these local fair-trade efforts were seen as 
exotic and generally shunned by the mainstream of the labor movement. 
For instance, in September, 1991, Massachusetts Jobs with Justice orga-
nized its first fair-trade protest at the Massachusetts State House when 
Carla Hills, the Bush Administration's trade representative, held a public 
hearing on NAFTA. Massachusetts AFL-CIO officials read canned testi-
mony against NAFTA at the hearing, but declined to participate in a 
lively demonstration of more than 100 trade unionists, environmentalists, 
and family farmers outside. 
A number of industrial unions eventually banded together under the 
auspices of the Citizen Trade Campaign to implement a stepped-up 
fightback strategy. During this time, the Minnesota-based Institute on 
Agriculture and Trade Policy was instrumental in organizing and assist-
ing many isolated grassroots efforts that were struggling to survive. 
The Fair Trade Campaign scored its first legislative victory in October, 
1992. With help from a few groups in Washington like the Nader-backed 
Public Citizen, local coalitions were instrumental in getting a large 
majority in the House of Representatives to co-sponsor a resolution 
rejecting any trade agreement that compromised labor or environmental 
standards. Although largely symbolic, this early success was an impor-
tant shot across the bow for free-trade proponents in both parties. 
Suddenly, despite the overwhelming support for fast track, the passage 
of NAFTA was not assured. The campaign to get co- sponsors for the 
f 
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resolution (now led by Representative Gephardt) knit together the 
forces for fair trade and tested the capacity and strength of the grass-
roots organizations. Equally important, it became clear who our major 
allies and enemies on Capitol Hill would be well in advance. It also 
helped focus the efforts of the growing number of fair-trade coalitions 
across the country which by now were emerging as a real force in the 
national debate on trade policy. 
THE MASSACHUSETTS EXAMPLE 
The Massachusetts fair-trade fight was in many ways a microcosm 
of the national effort. Here, the local chapter of Jobs with Justice (JwJ) 
organized a fair-trade committee in 1991. The group sponsored a num-
ber of well-attended educational forums, held several press conferences, 
trained speakers to "Rap Against NAFTA," and provided community 
and labor leaders with reams of information on the seemingly endless 
NAFTA and GATT negotiations. At the time, no one knew which would 
come before Congress first. By February, 1993, the committee had 
launched an ambitious state- wide grassroots petition drive to oppose 
NAFTA. Thirty-five community and labor groups endorsed and participated. 
The signature campaign was kicked off with nine labor-led community-
based press conferences in cities and towns across the Commonwealth. 
The press coverage—and the extent of local participation—surprised 
many skeptics who didn't believe that such a seemingly abstruse issue 
could engage activists or local media at the grassroots level. Eventually, 
tens of thousands of signatures were gathered and turned in to mem-
bers of the Massachusetts Congressional delegation. 
One of the best features of the local coalition was the frequent meet-
ings where a wide variety of organizations and activists shared strategies 
and perspectives on trade issues. Committee meetings in Massachusetts 
included union representatives from the Teamsters, ILGWU, UE, IUE, 
and Letter Carriers. On the community side, the most active partici-
pants were from the Massachusetts Toxics Campaign, the Student 
Environmental Action Coalition, Massachusetts Save James Bay, the 
Lawyers Guild, several Central America solidarity groups, and the Immi-
grant Workers' Resource Center. 
Over time, many smaller grassroots organizations and concerned 
individuals also began to work closely with JwJ. This occasionally led to 
some interesting cultural and political problems. Many of the small 
groups and almost all of the "loners" were unaccustomed to the political 
etiquette of coalition politics or the intricacies of the labor movement. 
At times they found the coalition confusing and cumbersome. For 
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example, a small group called Put Americans to Work held strongly 
"Buy American" and traditionally patriotic views. To demonstrate the 
depth of their opposition to NAFTA, they urged everyone to hang their 
America flags upside down—a traditional sign of distress in wartime. 
This resulted in a lengthy debate about love of flag and country that 
tied up several meetings, frustrated everyone, and led nowhere. 
PATW's overt patriotism and nativist outlook alienated many liberals 
in the group. But it was hard to overlook their success in gathering more 
signatures than any other participating organization. Persistent problems 
also occurred with the growing number of well-meaning individuals 
unaffiliated to any organization who flocked to the trade campaign. 
In hindsight, leaving membership criteria as well as decisionmaking 
procedures somewhat vague wasted a lot of time and effort. 
JUST SAY NO! 
Probably the biggest debate was whether we should "Just say No" to 
NAFTA or begin to promote a longer-term "fair-trade" alternative. The 
union establishment—both locally and nationally—generally sought to 
avoid what might be a difficult and potentially divisive discussion about 
the mobility of capital and the regulation of the international exchange 
of goods and services. Others, particularly the more left-leaning mem-
bers in the group, saw the anti-NAFTA campaign as an opportunity to 
bring together a broad base of people around a new, positive vision of inter-
national labor solidarity and community control over capital investment. 
The lobbying effort to convince members of Congress to vote against 
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NAFTA also brought out deeply contrasting styles on how best to bring 
pressure to bear. Officials of the Massachusetts AFL-CIO, who are more 
comfortable meeting behind closed doors, convened private sessions 
to lobby members of Congress to vote against NAFTA. 
JwJ organized a number of constituent delegations that usually involved 
large numbers of grassroots leaders from within each congressional district. 
Invariably, after a month or so of applying pressure for a meeting with a 
Congress member an aide would call and notify us that we could have 
30 minutes "the day after tomorrow." This put us in a mad scramble to 
assemble a credible local grouping on very short notice. Usually the aide 
would also say something like, "Just bring a few people." We usually 
ignored this advice and always tried to bring the largest group possible. 
In another case, at the height of the campaign, Clinton came to 
Boston for the dedication of the new Kennedy Memorial Library. To 
the disappointment of many activists, Representative Joseph Moakley 
(D-South Boston) succeeded in getting the state AFL-CIO to discourage 
any anti-NAFTA demonstrations during Clinton's visit. The peace 
treaty was in exchange for some assurances that Clinton would not use 
the dedication ceremonies or a brief visit afterwards to a large nonunion 
Gillette plant to promote NAFTA. The compromise left a lot of local 
folks wondering how deep the AFL-CIO's concern about NAFTA really 
was—especially after Clinton made NAFTA a center piece of his remarks 
at both the party and plant, much to the chagrin of many labor officials. 
As the vote neared last fall, the campaign mushroomed into a statewide 
publicity and lobbying blitz, mobilizing hundreds of union members 
and their families who had previously been uninvolved in trade issues. 
They found themselves pitted against the supposedly pro-labor Mass-
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achusetts Congressional delegation. Jobs with Justice's final effort was 
coordinating a four-day, 16-city Teamster tractor-trailer caravan. The 
caravan was aimed at increasing the pressure on the four remaining 
undecided Representatives who had not announced how they would vote. 
Complete with mobile phones, banners, and thousands of postcards 
and flyers, the caravan kickoff in front of the Teamsters' local union hall 
was one of the biggest press events of the campaign, with nearly every 
local news outlet, and even some national reporters, attending. 
We learned a hard lesson in media work. Amidst the large crowd of 
Teamsters' members, union officials and other supporters milling around 
the grounds in front of the union hall, were two local union members 
dressed in ponchos and sombreros. It wasn't clear whose responsibility 
it was to deal with them. In the crush of reporters and personalities, no 
one thought too much about them. Too bad, because the next day, the 
Boston Globe led with a picture of these two guys on page one. That 
one photo helped undo months of solid progressive organizing and posi-
tive PR that JwJ had been building. 
There was one big surprise that came out of the Teamsters-JwJ caravan. 
Republican Congressman Peter Blute announced his opposition to 
NAFTA just hours before the caravan was to arrive in the biggest city 
in his district. However, his decision was more likely a recognition of 
the strong Perot base that he'll need to get re-elected than the result 
of pressure from progressive forces mobilized by labor in his district. 
The press conferences and demonstrations came to a crescendo in 
the final two weeks before the vote. Local talk shows actually competed 
for available labor representatives and other anti-NAFTA speakers. Even 
a hastily organized candlelight vigil in front of Ed Markey's office the 
night before the vote got great press. But in spite of all the lobbying, 
the Massachusetts House delegation split, with half voting yes and half 
voting no. 
IT'S TIME TO INVEST IN POLITICAL ALTERNATIVES 
Bill Clinton's unholy alliance with Congressional Republicans, his 
costly pork-barrel deals on behalf of ratification, and the powerful lobby-
ing of a united business community swung the votes in his favor in the 
House of Representatives on Nov. 17,1993. Unfortunately, most of the 
politicians who betrayed working people knew too well that they were 
secure in their offices. The liberal Massachusetts Representatives who 
voted for NAFTA were convinced that—even in a worst-case scenario 
—they could be assured of being re-elected without labor's active support. 
In retrospect, many seasoned political pundits were surprised that the 
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anti-NAFTA mobilization lasted for more than three years and even gained 
strength as time passed. In early 1991, when fast-track legislation passed, 
most people in grassroots leadership positions thought NAFTA's approval 
was a certainty. As a result, some groups decided to offer critical sup-
port for NAFTA in exchange for a seat at the policy table. Many others, 
however, persevered in building a progressive anti-NAFTA perspective 
at the grassroots level with farmers, workers, and environmentalists. 
No one could have predicted how quickly things changed as the econ-
omy turned downward. The all but invincible Bush Administration was 
severely weakened; candidate Clinton waffled; and of all people, Ross 
Perot stepped forward. To everyone's surprise, the grassroots movement 
found itself in position to champion what had suddenly became a real 
national movement. 
The anti-NAFTA movement successfully captured broad working-class 
anxiety and anger over the state of the economy. The labor movement 
found itself in the position of articulating the plight of working people 
and providing organizational leadership for both the organized and 
unorganized. Fair-trade activists—previously isolated on the margins— 
became mainstream leaders because, when the political winds shifted, 
they were prepared to seize the moment by presenting an analysis and 
an alternative vision. The anti-NAFTA message had a clear rich-against-
poor internationalist content—especially when it was coupled with the 
concrete presence of Mexican and Canadian trade unionists and other 
non-U.S., anti-NAFTA activists. 
The heartfelt discussion and heated debates in grassroots anti- NAFTA 
coalitions throughout the country reflected well the current American 
political terrain. Many of the alliances were genuinely new and unprece-
dented. That forces as disparate as the Teamsters and the Rain Forest 
Action Network or Central America Solidarity Association found them-
selves seated next to one another was, one hopes, a harbinger of potent 
future alliances. 
In Massachusetts, as elsewhere, there was always tension between 
the progressive No NAFTA forces and the Perotistas. But by building 
a base alliance with the Perot forces, we engaged thousands of working 
people caught up in the same anxiety and anger as most union members 
over the future of the economy. Working with them undoubtedly left 
a strong impression about the labor movement and greater clarity about 
their true friends and enemies. 
But our political weakness—reflected in the loss when NAFTA came up 
for a vote—also underscored the need for a long-term political strategy 
that involves expanded support for independent political initiatives like 
Labor Party Advocates and the New Party—and a stepped-up commit-
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ment to community-labor coalitions like Jobs with Justice. Some union 
leaders are finally providing a real opening. Teamster President Ron 
Carey has called on labor to "develop political alternatives for the 1994 
and 1996 elections so that working people will not be taken for granted 
or forced to choose between the lesser of two evils." 
These steps towards independent political action will be a worth-
while investment in labor's future—a future without a total reliance on 
the Democrats to defend workers' interests in the political arena. Con-
versely, failure to develop real political alternatives will cede this fertile 
terrain to emerging right-wing populists who are only too eager to tap 
the huge reservoir of anger and pent-up frustration among America's 
working class. 
The fight against NAFTA made labor and environmental standards 
part of the national debate on trade policy. These concerns will remain 
important issues in future trade negotiations—including any talks to 
extend NAFTA to other Latin American countries. Currently, Chile is 
rumored to be the next signatory to a NAFTA- style free-trade deal with 
the U.S. 
Perhaps most important, the concept of fair trade—as opposed to free 
trade—will continue to be the rallying cry for workers and communities 
that want to chart their own destiny in the global economy. The chal-
lenge for fair-trade activists is to build on the strength of the grassroots 
coalitions that emerged to fight NAFTA's passage. Our next step must 
be to promote concrete policies that will strengthen the hands of commu-
nities and workers struggling to achieve a high standard of living in the 
context of the global economy. • 
